Tag Archives: Venture Capital

No Business Plan? No Worry?

A study dated December 2008 shows that submitting a business plan to venture capitalists would be at best a symbolic act, at worst of no interest or at least with no relation to the investment decision.

The paper entitled “Form or Substance: The Role of Business Plans in Venture Capital Decision Making” was written by David Kirsch, Brent Goldfarb and Azi Gera of the University of Maryland and published in the Strategic Management Journal.

Based on the analysis of more than 1000 documents, les authors have tested 7 hypotheses relative to business plans:

1- the impact of a standard document,

2- statements of prior non-VC external private equity funding

3- the articulation of financing requests

4- reference to management team members

5- reference to prior educational human capital

6- reference to the prior entrepreneurial experience of founding team members

7- reference to the prior professional business experience of founding team members.

The results are quite striking: hypotheses 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 are not validated et only hypotheses 4 and 6 would received a limited validation.

Their conclusions are quite clear: “business planning artifacts are not important sources of information for venture decision makers. The submission of planning documents is, at best, a ceremonial act.” and they add “neither the presence of business planning documents nor their content serve a communicative role for venture capitalists… Critical information is learned through alternative channels.”.

But I need to add, and this is now a personal point of view, that all this does not mean that a business plan is not necessary for any entrepreneur who wishes to raise capital…

About Kleiner Perkins first fund (episode 3)

Eureka! After my previous episodes on KP’s first fund (episode 2 and episode 1), I got more.

A few days ago, I received an “old” book, The New Venturers: Inside the high stakes word of venture capital by John G. Wilson (Addison-Wesley, 1985). This is a great book about the early history of venture capital and Wilson had many interesting data. Chapter 5 “The New Entrepreneurs” is about Kleiner Perkins and Wilson publishes there KP’s first fund portfolio and performance. The data are consistent with Golis’ data in my previous post but still different…

Unfortunately Wilson does not mention his sources and when I asked Perkins again about these, he answered: “Each name rings true in my memory, but I have no idea if the numbers are accurate.   I think John Wilson got his hands on one or our reports  to the Limited Partners—not directly from us.  It’s probably all correct.”

If anyone can help me knowing more, i.e. access to KP’s LPs (Wilmington Securities for example) or to John Wilson… there might be an episode 4!

The Ultimate Cure, a great novel

Not only is The Ultimate Cure a good novel which describes the start-up life, the venture capitalists and what it costs to be an entrepreneur (and it reminds me of Po Bronson’s The First $20 Million Is Always The Hardest) but it is also a great novel, about human nature and what drives us in life. Here it reminds me of Swiss rising star, Martin Suter and his psychological thrillers. Most importantly, it is a great pleasure to read.

Author Peter Harboe-Schmidt has done a really nice “oeuvre”. Here is just a small piece:

“Take your start-up as an example. Why did you do it? If you analyzed the pros and cons for doing a start-up, you’d probably never do it. But your gut feeling pushed you on, knowing that you would get something very valuable out of it. Am I right?”
Martin speculated on why he was so drawn to a world that at times could appear to be no more than sheer madness. Like a world parallel to real life with many of the same attributes, just much more intense and fast-moving. People trying to realize a dream in a world of unpredictability and unknowns, working crazy hours, sacrificing their personal lives, rushing along with all those other technology based start-ups. Medical devices, Internet search engines, telecommunications, nanotechnologies and all the rest competing for the same thing: Money. To make the realization clock tick a little faster.
“Funny you should say that,” Martin finally said. “I’ve always thought of this start-up as a no-brainer.I never tried to justify it in any way.”

About Kleiner Perkins first fund (episode 2)

Was the information provided in episode 1 correct? I decided to try and contact Tom Perkins, the famous VC and he answered!

“I looked at the data you sent but, honestly, I don’t know where they came from.  We have never given this sort of thing out,  and we would have a lot of trouble even to find it today. I don’t think we had so many investments in that first fund—seventeen seems far to many.  The ones which I recall I put into my book. Having said that, I do believe that the fund would have achieved a modest return without Tandem and Genentech.  Those two were most important in changing our way for V.C. in the future.”

What does Perkins mean? In each case, KP co-founded the companies and did not simply invest in them. So where were these numbers coming from? After some research via the web, I found on Google Books the next table, from the book Enterprise and Venture Capital by Christopher Golis.

If correct, they would be however different from the ones I had before even if they are quite similar.

I checked Perkins’ book and Perkins obviously mentions Tandem and Genentech. He also mentions Advanced Recreation Equipment (aka Snow-Job, a company which converted motorbikes into snowmobiles) and American Athletic Shoe (re-soled tennis shoes). He adds: “Unsurprisingly, both failed”. He also mentions Qume as a nice return. Not much more.

So I asked Golis where all this came from…  “I cannot remember where I got it as I actually wrote the 4th edition some 8 years ago.  However I only put the table in the 4th edition.   Comparing the bibiographies of the third and fourth editions I would say the source was Gompers.  However Nesheim, Lewis, or Kaplan are potentially other sources. Hope this is of some help.”

Well, well… To know more, you will have to wait for episode 3!

About Kleiner Perkins first fund (episode 1)

As I mentioned in my previous post about returns of venture capital, I was lucky enough to see the performances of Kleiner Perkins first fund (launched in 1972). Here is the slide I discovered in mid-December.

I was extremely surprised to find such data. They are usually difficult, not to say impossible to get. I asked the author where he got them. He thought he had read them from a book by a Kleiner Perkins partner. I contacted him and he replied: “Not possible that it came from me. I don’t have such information. Not sure I have ever seen the returns for KPCB 1. I don’t know where the information could have come from.” Too bad.

I also try to “measure the bars” and rebuild what it could have meant in terms of numbers. Here are my measures.

A couple of comments (if we admit all this is true):
– Genentech and Tandem were two home runs (out of 17 deals).
– Even if these two had not worked, the fund value would be $17.8M, i.e. a 2.8x multiple. This would have been a decent return compared to even the best VC funds…

But is this true? You will have to wait for episode 2!

Returns of Venture Capital

Venture Capital returns remain very difficult to analyze mostly because access to data is tough. There are some web sites such as venturereturns but more interesting are the official reports of endowment funds such as the University of California, Washington State or Castle in Europe. Most venture capital firms do not publish any data.

In chapter 5 of “Start-Up”, I have published the following table:

Now let me publish them for some specific funds:

I had not mentioned before KP and Sequoia first funds which is something I plan to work on in the next weeks. Anyone with data would interest me! Late last year I was lucky enough to “see” KP first fund’s portfolio performance in more details which I will describe in my next post…

Once you’re lucky, Twice you’re good.

This is the third book I report on this blog about entrepreneurs. In fact it is the fourth if I include Inside Steve’s Brain (but this one is about a single entrepreneur). The two previous ones were interviews of many, i.e. Betting it all and Founders at Work. The beauty (and at same time weakness) of Once you’re lucky, Twice you’re good is that is is about web2.0. Is this new step in the Internet development a speculative bubble or a speculative revolution. It is probably too early to say even if author Tracy Lacy (appearing in another post) is quite convinced it is a revolution.

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It is a beautiful book because it shows once again the richness of individual connections. I have done below my illustration of it. Paypal and its founders appear to be at the center of this network. Fairchild had such a similar situation at the beginning of Silicon Valley in the sixties, Apple, Sun, Cisco thereafter.

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Another interesting element is about investors. There has been a popular idea that web2.0 was not funded by venture capitalists anymore because the web2.0 business angels who were web1.0 entrepreneurs had learnt their lesson. The situation is more complex as the web2.0 financing shows. Greylock, CRV, Accel but also Benchmark and Sequoia are vey active. Finally, it shows again and again what entrepreneurs are: passionate, driven individuals and I can only advise reading the epilogue about Levchin’s childhood. Quite fascinating…

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Source: Crunchbase and companies’ web sites.

Equity split in start-ups

Following a few case studies I posted earlier this year (Kelkoo, Skype, mysql), here is a more generic analysis about the process of equity splitting. The document is a pdf file I have used a number of times with students, entrepreneurs and I think it is helpful even if not new. At the end, there are also cap tables of other famous and less famous start-ups.

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From the inception where a few founders share the initial equity between them to the exit (IPO or M&A) through a possible number of financing events, shares of a start-ups will be shared, distributed among founders, employees and investors. It is one of the most important decisions in a company’s life and should be handled with care.

Is Silicon Valley in trouble?

A scary video interview about Silicon Valley and I can not fully disagree: the IT industry is maturing so innnovation may be less relevant than it has been.The VC industry is in trouble though it will not admit it. Risk taking is disappearing. “Engineers are gun shy of start-ups”. What a terrible message.

Of course, there is hope: this is not new… Silicon Valley Fever is a 1984 book which already described the troubles start-ups and engineers could experience. People always claimed there were too few deals for too much money.

Whatever, enjoy and comment if you wish…

PS: thanks to Andre M.  for drawing this video to my attention!

Cap. Table: Kelkoo

Kelkoo is a great case study. It was one, not to say the, success story of the Internet in France and even in Europe. It was acquired by Yahoo for €475M in 2004. It was extremely ambitious from its foundation and had an amazing pan-European strategy thanks to acquisitions in Spain, the UK and Scandinavia: DondeCom, Shopgenie and ZoomIT. Kelkoo raised more than €45M in less than 12 months! Therefore the founders faced a huge dilution linked to three rounds of financings and these three mergers & acquisitions (“M&As”).

The capitalization table and the figures below show the evolution of the numbers. I am aware that these data are dry, tough to read, but if the reader accepts to follow me, he or she may find them of interest. Let us begin by the last table which describes the financing rounds. In 1999, Kelkoo was founded by five individuals (Chappaz, Lopez, Amouroux, Odin and Mercier) and immediately financed by two venture capitalists (“VCs”): Banexi and Innovacom. The two funds provided €1.5M in December 1999 (A round) and then a little more than €4M in March 2000 (B round). There is an important detail to notice: there was a 1 to 50 stock split between the two rounds; it explains the huge difference in the numbers as well as the fact that the price per share of €24.67 of the A round is equivalent to €0.50 after the split. The price per share of the B round was €1.45. The five founders had shared their stock as 1/3 to Chappaz, 1/3 to Lopez and the remaining between the three others. However options were granted to Chappaz and Mercier at B round to give a new founders’ balance. The pies below give therefore different ratios. Dominique Vidal is not a founder but was working with Banexi when Kelkoo was founded. He joined the founders to become a managing director and received initially 338’000 shares. He received more shares with time but the final number is not known (so I make an assumption in his case). Finally a stock-option plan was created to incentivize employees. Those had virtually 19% of the company at round B. We were only in March 2000 and the data are already complex. The capitalization table can be read on the right part with number of shares or on the left part as percent of the company.

(Click on pictures to enlarge or download)

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The situation is even more complex with the acquisitions. First DondeCom (Spain) and ShopGenie (UK) in June 2000. Kelkoo kept about 50% of the shares and the new entrants the other 50%. Also in June 2000, Kelkoo raised its C round of €30M. In September another €6M were raised with the same terms. Initially the price per share was €1.99. But there was a major condition: Kelkko had to provide an exit, a liquidity event to the investors in 2001 or the price per share would decrease to €1.70. There was no IPO or M&A for Kelkoo, i.e. no exit, so that the investors received free shares to reduce the price per share. This implies a valuation of €96M for the C round and the investors of that round owned 37% of Kelkoo. Then came the ZoomIT acquisition, which gave a little less then 30% to the new comers.

Yahoo bought Kelkoo for €475M meaning a price per share of €5.7 if the reader accepts that the total number of shares is correct. The last column therefore gives the value of their shares for all stockholders (but it does not indicate it much these cost; this cost would have to be deducted to know the profit before tax). I can not be too far from real numbers but as I said with my previous examples (Skype, mysql) these numbers are never sure at 100%. The capital increases are however well described in documents from the register of commerce that I bought for this study. The exact number of exercised shares is however unsure. These documents were my only source of information for this study. The history of Kelkoo is also written in the book “Ils ont réussi leur start-up” at Village Mondial (Pearson France). Pierre Chappaz is today the CEO of Wikio and is also the author of an excellent blog, Kelblog. Finally, Pierre made a great presentation of his stroy at EPFL in 2005.

Source: www.euridile.fr

(Click on pictures to enlarge or download)

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