Tag Archives: Venture Capital

What to expect from an investor?

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I am again taking advantage of the questions asked to me to write a post (after the one on the impact of the personality of founders on the success of startups). I could have titled this post “what do investors expect?”, I look here at both subjects.This time, I even copy a part of the message I received:

Context: Just to share with you the dynamics of investors (very early stage) who look at my project. I have received 10+ requests, sometimes from investors who want to make an initial contact call (to follow developments in typically 6 months). Some display their investment thesis upfront (sometimes stratospheric expectations). I try not to waste too much time with such requests, to focus on my product (and Product-Market-Fit – PMF, *the priority*!), but what do you think of this typology of investors? Very early, who favor the blank page vs. PMF but with enormous expectations (100x potential ROI).
(I know that several entrepreneurs are experiencing a bit of the same thing at the moment). I can’t imagine how a founder can calmly seek his or her PMF having onboarded this type of VC and under their pressure (100x and not 10 or 20x!)…
Questions :
1) Are they intrinsically better or worse than more “common” funders (5x-7x under ~5 years, or 10x under 7-10 years)? (I’m exaggerating on purpose, of course).
2) The less-pressing alternative would be a collection exclusively made up of BAs and/or BA-Networks, but does the absence of institutional SEED investors send a bad signal to VCs? A sign of too little ambition? A potential lack of initial attractiveness?
3) There is a strong trend towards “leaner startups” which give less and less equity in pre-seed / seed (including to YC). However, institutional investors often want a double-digit equity share. What is your vision/experience in European VCs? Is leaner (equity shared) better or less attractive? Many startups (even at YC) do not give more than 10% of total equity across the SEED round (+ the initial 7% from YC, or other more or less equivalent SAFEs).

I answered a little quickly like this and I’m going to add a little more, notably a new update: an update of my pdf of cap tables, which includes more than 900 companies now…

This is a true wrong question! But I’m not an entrepreneur, I’m a mentor!
The main thing is the added value of your investor in two dimensions:
– the amount invested,
– the quality of advice.
We could almost say that if one of the two dimensions is zero then the other must be very high, and we can therefore accept that one is weak.
You dream of having a renowned VC or BA (her name and her credibility), this undoubtedly has a price!
Then the lower the amount, the greater the expected multiple. If you put 10k you hope to make x1000, if you put 100K you hope to make x100 if you put 1M you hope to make x10.
In reality it’s more a question of stage, in series D, E, F, it’s probably 2x-3x, in A, B it’s 10x, in seed, it’s 100x, in pre-seed it’s 1000x
– Google had David Cheriton and Andy Bechtolsheim as BAs, they put in 100k, I think they made 400M…
– Sequoia and KP put in $12M and made $2B
(see page 47 of the pdf, $85/$0.06 and $85/$0.52 for the multiples at the IPO but they sold at least six months later and I think it was worth at least 3x or 4x more)
On the last point, it’s not easy either, but Stanford had around 2% of Google at the time of creation, which is unusually low and it is paradoxically their biggest grain, we can see the diversity of criteria.

So let me add a couple of points. I thought Paul Graham (YCombinator) would have provided answers on his blog paulgraham.com but did not find an answer. Howver he keeps on writing great things like:
– How to start Google (March 2024) https://paulgraham.com/google.html
– Superlinear returns (October 2023) https://paulgraham.com/superlinear.html

The two figures that follow illustrate the explanations above. The pdf therefore gives more than 900 cap tables which can illustrate the diversity of multiples (theoretical at the IPO).
Finally, it is still quite rare for an investor to contact an entrepreneur directly (even if it can also happen). The contact is rather established by a third party who knows both the entrepreneur and the institutional investor, for example the Business Angel or the mentor…

Finally, the percentage given in return for an investment is not linear either. It depends on the stage of development of the company of course but on the amount itself!
– for 100k, we typically give 5-15%,
– for 1M it’s more like 40%,
– for 10M and more we fall back to amounts of around 10%.
This may seem counterintuitive and it shows that the percentages are not the result of accounting but of negotiations.
I add two recent French startup cap tables, Mistral AI and H.ai which show that exceptional fundraising leads to exceptional valuations and therefore unusual percentages. These were built with assumptions given my media or data from company documents.

The BA, business angel, is a wealthy individual who invests his own money (generally at least 100k per startup). Below we are talking more about F&F – Friends & Family.
VC (venture capital) invests third party money (pension funds, companies, banks, insurance companies, very wealthy individuals) generally with a minimum of 1 million per startup.
PE, private equity, is an institutional investment firm which takes less risk (even if the companies are not listed but generally profitable or with stable turnover). They invest large amounts but do not expect returns on investment as high as the VC.

Equity_List-Herve_Lebret-June_2024

Birth and Death of Silicon Valley ?

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At a time when Silicon Valley seems more powerful than ever, with GAFAs and others reaching values difficult to imagine just a few years ago, at a time when Artificial Intelligence seems to scare many and fascinate others with huge fund raising for openAI ($10B) or Inflection AI ($1B) [not to forget smaller French Mistral AI ($100M)], why would I like to talk about the death of Silicon Valley ?

The Birth and Growth of Silicon Valley

Well before digging any further, you may want to watch the short video above. And by the way when was Silicon Valley born ? I always claim it was in 1957 with the foundation of Fairchild (The First Trillion-Dollar Start-up) and the industry of the semiconductor. This is probably a little more complex as you’ll see in the video.

Now the figure above does not contradict that Silicon Valley began around that year, but the region was strong with microwave and power tubes before, mostly for military applications, with companies such as Litton Engineering Labs (1932), Hewlett-Packard (1939) or Varian Associates (1948). I took the figure from a book I found in my archive (but have not read yet – will do with maybe another blog article) : Making Silicon Valley – Innovation and the Growth of High Tech, 1930-1970 by Christophe Lécuyer.

Enough with history and back to the present. If you are not convinced by how powerful Silicon Valley is, just have a look at the table below. Even if I am aware that Microsoft and Amazon, neither Tesla anymore, do not belong geographically to Silicon Valley, they certainly are part of it from a cultural standpoint. And this is why I talk about the death of Silicon Valley. From a cultural standpoint.

Death of Silicon Valley from a Cultural Standpoint

A few days ago, friends from IMF sent me articles about the retirement of Michael Moritz. I would not be surprised if you do not know him, even if I mentioned his name on this bog in the past. He was a venture capitalist and venture capitalists are not the heroes of Silicon Valley. Bob Noyce, Steve Jobs, Larry Page and Sergey Brin were. Elon Musk probably not any more. “Look around who the heroes are. They aren’t lawyers, nor are they even so much the financiers. They’re the guys who start companies” (see here).

His Wikipedia page mentions “In July 2023, Moritz stepped down from Sequoia after nearly four decades.” It also adds that “his internet company investments include Google, Yahoo!, […] PayPal, Webvan, YouTube, eToys, and Zappos.” One can read for example on Techcrunch, Michael Moritz moves on, book-ending a long chapter at Sequoia Capital.

Moritz is in a long list of investors who decided to retire. The first generation stopped being active a long time ago (Arthur Rock, Don Valentine, Tom Perkins and Eugene Kleiner belong to that list) and the second generation is disappearing too (John Doerr who co-invested with Moritz in Google and was on the board of the company with him, also retired). All these relatively unknown people contributed in building Silicon Valley by supporting financially the most famous entrepreneurs.

It is not the first time I expressed doubts about Silicon Valley:
– a series of 3 articles about Optimism and Disillusionment in Silicon Valley in January 2023,
– an article from September 2021, Silicon Valley will soon be 65. Should it be Retired ? with references to Silicon Valley 2018 : The Libertarians Have Replaced the Hippies,
– or even older ones (2013) The promise of technology. Disappointing? and The Capital Sins of Silicon Valley.

It is really strange that a region could keep being so innovative more now for more than 60 years. And it will probably continue to be for a while. What is less clear is the continuation of this unique culture that Olivier Alexandre has brilliantly explained in his recent book, La tech.

We shall see…

Silicon Valley Bank and Venture Capital

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I have been very surprised by the bankruptcy of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB). Silicon Valley finance was (and I think still is) about venture capital and not banking, about equity and not loans/debts. So how is it possible that a bank fail by serving startups?

When I was in venture capital, and this is 20 years ago, startups would marginally borrow money. Banks indeed did not trust these fragile entities and they were statistically right. Of course startups could borrow money if they had sound collaterals like equipment and this is when Silicon Valley Bank and its peers were used by startups: for leasing for example (office space, equipment that could be reused).

Apparently things have changed as I recently learned. Some venture capitalists managed to convince SVB to go further. Money was cheap and if “powerful” VCs were financing a startup, then SVB thought the startup was solid.

As the article by the New Yorker below says, it appears to have been a combination of incompetent management, lax regulation, and some powerful people in Silicon Valley crying fire in a crowded theatre.

You may read additional material from the New Yorker with
– The Old Policy Issues Behind the New Banking Turmoil (March 13)
– Why Barney Frank Went to Work for Signature Bank (March 15)
Another interesting article is In Their Own Words: What Silicon Valley Bank Meant To The Valley

There is also this interview about Peter Thiel’s role in SVB collapse

Some quotes include :
“Silicon Valley has an image problem but remains hugely popular.”
“The issue is not that VCS are powerful but more not as smart as they think they are”.

Finally, there is no doubt that the money had become very easy, in too big quantity as indicated by the wikipedia page about SVB. The end of megarounds and the recent new startup crisis have played their part.

This probably needs to be looked at over the long term. When I wrote my book, I had a look at the correlations between the Nasdaq Index, VC fund raising and the economic crisis. Here is what it gave:

and here is what it looks like in 2022 with, among other things, the 2008 crisis

I post this article because I was invited to debate about Silicon Valley, Venture Capital and how can technology startups my impact the banking system on France Culture in Entendez-vous l’éco ? (in French). I now have to read the new book of the other guest, Olivier Alexandre, La tech. Quand la Silicon Valley refait le monde (Seuil, 2023) (Tech. When Silicon Valley changes the world) which seems very interesting. Probably a futrure post.

A Library of Books about Startups, High-Tech, Innovation

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I began this blog in July 2007, so more than 15 years ago. I began my professional activity around startups in September 1997, so more than 25 years ago. So many adventures, so many great moments. And so much book reading! I revisited these pages and did an exhaustive list of the books I could remember reading. Most have a post somewhere in the blog.

I created a little artificially 6 categories:
– About Google and Apple
– Entrepreneurs’ Biographies
– Startup Stories and Analyses
– Ecosystems and Innovation
– Venture Capital
– How to
– Fictions / Thrillers (or close)

Here they are… Enjoy (maybe!)

About Google and Apple

  • Goomics, Google’s corporate culture revealed through internal comics, Manu Cornet
  • In the Plex, How Google Thinks, Works and Shapes Our Lives, Stephen Levy
  • How Google Works, Eric Schmidt, Jonathan Rosenberg
  • Dogfight, How Apple and Google Went to War and Started a Revolution, Fred Vogelstein
  • I’M Feeling Lucky, Falling On My Feet in Silicon Valley, Douglas Edwards
  • The Apple Revolution, Steve Jobs, the Counter Culture and How the Crazy Ones Took Over the World, Luke Dormehl
  • Work Rules! Insights from inside Google that will transform how you live and lead, Laszlo Bock
  • The Google Story, David Vise
  • Return to the Little Kingdom, How Apple and Steve Jobs Changed the World, Michael Moritz

Biographies

  • Elon Musk, Tesla, SpaceX, and the Quest for A Fantastic Future, Ashlee Vance
  • Steve Jobs, La vie d’un génie, Walter Isaacson
  • Inside Steve’s Brain, Leander Kahney
  • The Man Behind the Microchip, Robert Noyce and the Invention of Silicon Valley, Leslie Berlin

Startups Stories / Analyses

  • Trillion Dollar Coach, The Leadership Playbook of Silicon Valley’s Bill Campbell, Eric Schmidt, Jonathan Rosenberg, and Alan Eagle
  • L’entrepreneuriat en action, Ou comment de jeunes ingénieurs créent des entreprises innovantes, Philippe Mustar
  • Chercheurs et entrepreneurs : c’est possible ! Belles histoires du numérique à la française, Laurent Kott, Antoine Petit
  • Bad Blood, Secrets and Lies in a Silicon Valley Startup, John Carreyrou
  • Bienvenue dans le Nouveau Monde, Comment j’ai survécu à la coolitude des startups, Mathilde Ramadier
  • Les start-up expliquées à ma fille, L’entrepreneuriat vu de l’intérieur, Guillene Ribière
  • Startup, Arrêtons la mascarade, Contribuer vraiment à l’économie de demain, Nicolas Menet, Benjamin Zimmer
  • No Exit, Struggling to Survive a Modern Gold Rush, Gideon Lewis-Kraus
  • The Hard Thing About Hard Things, Building a Business When There are no Easy Answers, Ben Horowitz
  • Zero to One, Notes on Startups, or How to Build the Future, Peter Thiel, Blake Masters
  • Startupland, How Three Guys Risked Everything to Turn an Idea into a Global Business, Mikkel Svane, Carlye Adler
  • European Founders at Work, Pedro Gairifo Santos
  • Founders at Work, Stories of Startups’ Early Days, Jessica Livingston
  • The Monk and the Riddle, The Education of a Silicon Valley Entrepreneur, Randy Komisar
  • Once you’re lucky, Twice you’re good, The Rebirth of Silicon Valley and the Rise of Web, Sarah Lacy
  • They Made It! Angelika Blendstrup
  • Betting It All, The Entrepreneurs of Technology, Michael Malone,
  • In the Company of Giants, Candid Conversations With the Visionaries of the Digital World, Rama Dev Jager, Rafael Ortiz
  • Startup, A Silicon Valley Adventure, Jerry Kaplan

Ecosystems and Innovation

  • From the Basement to the Dome, How MIT’s Unique Culture Created a Thriving Entrepreneurial Community, Jean-Jacques Degroof
  • The Microchip Revolution: A brief history, Luc O. Bauer, E. Marshall Wilder
  • The Code, Silicon Valley and the Remaking of America, Margaret O’Mara
  • Loonshots or how to nurture crazy ideas, Safi Bahcall
  • Troublemakers, How Generation of Silicon Valley Upstarts Invented the Future, Leslie Berlin
  • The Rainforest, The Secret to Building the Next Silicon Valley, Victor W. Hwang, Greg Horowitt
  • The Innovators, How a Group of Hackers, Geniuses, and Geeks Created the Digital Revolution, Walter Isaacson
  • The Entrepreneurial State, Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths, Mariana Mazzucato
  • Genentech, The Beginnings of Biotech, Sally Smith Hughes
  • Science Lessons, What the Business of Biotech Taught Me About Management, Gordon Binder
  • Le prochain Google sera Suisse (à 10 conditions), Fathi Derder
  • Prophet of Innovation, Joseph Schumpeter and Creative Destruction, Thomas McCraw
  • Start-up Nation, The Story of Israel’s Economic Miracle, Dan Senor, Saul Singer
  • Boulevard of Broken Dreams, Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed–and What to Do About It, Josh Lerner
  • The Innovation Illusion, How So Little is Created by So Many Working So Hard, Fredrik Erixon, Bjorn Weige
  • Un paléoanthropologue dans l’entreprise, S’adapter et innover pour survivre, Pascal Picq
  • Against Intellectual Monopoly, Michele Boldrin and David K. Levine
  • The New Argonauts, Regional Advantage in a Global Economy, AnnaLee Saxenian
  • Regional Advantage, Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128, AnnaLee Saxenian
  • Silicon Valley Fever, Growth of High Technology Culture, Everett M. Rogers, Judith K. Larsen
  • Creating the Cold War University, The Transformation of Stanford, Rebecca S. Lowen
  • Nurturing Science-based Ventures, An International Case Perspective, Ralf Seifert, Benoït Leleux, Christopher Tucci
  • Entrepreneurship and Innovation, Peter F. Drucker
  • The Gorilla Game, Picking Winners in High Technology, Geoffrey Moore
  • Inside the Tornado, Strategies for Developing, Leveraging, and Surviving Hypergrowth Markets, Geoffrey Moore
  • Crossing the Chasm, Marketing and Selling High-Tech Products to Mainstream Customers, Geoffrey Moore
  • The Founder’s Dilemmas, Anticipating and Avoiding the Pitfalls That Can Sink a Startup, Noam Wasserman
  • The Innovators Dilemma, When New Technologies Cause Good Firms To Fail, Clayton M. Christensen
  • Accidental Empires, How the Boys of Silicon Valley Make Their Millions, Battle Foreign Competition, and Still Can’t Get a Date, Robert X. Cringley

Venture Capital

  • The Power Law, Venture Capital and the Making of the New Future, Sebastian Mallaby
  • The Masters of Private Equity and Venture Capital, Management Lessons from the Pioneers of Private Investing, Robert A. Finkel
  • The Startup Game, Inside the Partnership between Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs, William H. Draper III
  • Creative Capital, Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital, Spencer Ante
  • The Business of Venture Capital, Insights from Leading Practitioners on the Art of Raising a Fund, Deal Structuring, Value Creation, and Exit Strategies, Mahendra Ramsinghani
  • The New Venturers, Inside the High-Stakes World of Venture Capital, John Wilson

 

How To

  • The Mom Test, How to talk to customers & learn if your business is a good idea when everyone is lying to you, Rob Fitzpatrick
  • Straight Talk for Startups, 100 Insider Rules for Beating the Odds, Randy Komisar, Jantoon Reigersman
  • Measure What Matters, OKRs, The Simple Idea that Drives 10x Growth, John Doerr,
  • The start-up of You, Adapt to the Future, Invest in Yourself, and Transform Your Career, Reid Hoffman
  • Don’t f**k it up, How Founders and Their Successors Can Avoid the Clichés That Inhibit Growth, Les Trachtman
  • How To Start a Business That Doesn’t Suck (and will actually turn a profit), Michael Clarke
  • The Four Steps to the Epiphany, Successful Strategies for Products That Win, Steve Blank (NB: the book has been updated and renamed as The Startup Owner’s Manual, The Step-by-Step Guide for Building a Great Company, Steve Blank, Bob Dorf)
  • The Lean Startup, How Today’s Entrepreneurs Use Continuous Innovation to Create Radically Successful Businesses, Eric Ries
  • Business Model Generation, Alexander Osterwalder and Yves Pigneur
  • Slicing Pie, Funding Your Company Without Funds, Mike Moyer
  • Getting to Plan B, Breaking Through to a Better Business Model, John Mullins, Randy Komisar
  • Winning Opportunities, Proven Tools for Converting Your Projects into Success (without a Business Plan), Raphael Cohen
  • Start-up, (anti-)bible à l’usage des fous et des futurs entrepreneurs, Bruno Martinaud
  • The Art of the Start, GuyKawasaki

 

Fiction / Thrillers or close

  • Drop by Drop, Keith Raffel
  • Smasher, a Silicon Valley Mystery, Keith Raffel
  • dead, a Silicon Valley Mystery, Keith Raffel
  • The Ultimate Cure, Peter Harboe-Schmidt
  • The First $20 Million Is Always The Hardest, Po Bronson
  • The Nudist on the Late Shift, And Other True Tales of Silicon Valley, Po Bronson

Figma, a new cap. table and there is much more to Dylan Field’s story

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Figma is the latest startup success story. Not an IPO, there are so few in 2022, but a $20B acquisition by Adobe. I did not have much data to build its cap. table so this is mostly tentative. Still it is interesting. So here it is. However there is much more to the story of its founders Dylan Field and Evan Wallace. Read below.

Not much to add to the numbers except the founders (including possibly some earnout shares) & investors stake, 20% & 50% respectively as well as the time it took for all this. A few months for seed, 10 years for an exit.

Photographer: David Paul Morris/Bloomberg

So let us have a look more specifically at Dylan Field. Again the typical even if rare school drop-out in his early twenties who is still the CEO 10 years later. His cofounder is a friend. The rest is history. Well not really. Read his Wikipedia page for more or this article from Business Insider.

First, Field received the $100k that Peter Thiel was offering to young students ready to drop out of school. Field’s parents were against the idea but Field dropped out of Brown University. I have always been intrigued with the idea of pushing people out of school. Will Field ever go back there?

Second, he found some VC money despite the fact that Field recalled that he experienced a “wake up call” when [a potential] investor turned down the chance to invest in Figma’s seed round and said, “I don’t think you know what you’re doing yet.”

Third, he remained as CEO despite his lack of business experience. At one point early into Figma’s existence, Field said he once faced the very real risk of an exodus of disaffected employees. He had to learn, quickly, how to be more open to feedback and to empower his teams, while also hiring experienced managers. “I didn’t know how to manage effectively,” he said. “I didn’t know the basics around how to have good judgment around who to hire. When we were 10 people, I was a year into management. Usually if you are a new manager, you manage a few people. I was trying to do this at the same time and get the product to market.” Apparently he survived a few crises and the VCs let him lead.

There is certainly much more to learn from this unique story, but it is enough here. One final point. I would love to know more about VC performance. I worked at Index in the early days so I learnt that a great success does not guarantee a fund performance. But here Index made apparently more than $2B and made at least a 400x multiple in the seed part of its investment in Figma. But information about VC performance is close to impossible to find…

More (interesting?) data about French unicorns

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A month ago, I published data about French startups. I had been surprised to discover that access to data about private companies was finally possible for free in my dear country. So I looked at some (famous) French unicorns with an interest in the shareholder structure and how much money they had raised overall, as well as in their seed and A rounds. You will find the detailed information in a pdf in the bottom of the post.

But before moving on to this analysis, I want to mention an excellent article on seed fundraising, which gives advice and quite rich information. It is in French though and is entitled La levée de fonds seed ou amorçage. So here are the results:

In this first table, I just had a look at their age and fund raising. To give simple rule of thumbs, about the ones which are still private, they are about 5 to 15 years old, they have raised about €200M, with seed rounds of €0.5M and A round of €2-3M. The market capitalization should be (by definition) above one billion euros, but apparently this is not always the case (let us say that the value of a private company is a very volatile metric!) and the ratio of this value to amount raised seems also to be 5 to 15…

I then looked at how much dilution the seed and A rounds correspond to as well as the age of the companies for these rounds. Again, not taking outliers into account, both the seed and A rounds seem to induce a 25% dilution, therefore, with rounds of €0.5M and €2-3M respectively, the value at seed is about €2M and at A round is €8-12M. Finally the startups are less than 1-2 years old at seed and less than 4 years old at A round.

The last table is about the shareholding or equity structure as well as some data about the founders. The founders keep 25-30% of their startups, investors have 60-65% whereas employees have 5-10%.

There are about two founders per startup, they are surprisingly often below 30 with a median and average age of 29 and sadly with not a single woman.

Equity List – French Unicorns

The Power Law and Venture Capital (part 4), China’s rise

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In the part 1 of my post about The Power Law, I had embedded my own visual history of venture capital. There was a missing element which is China’s rise, that Mallaby adresses in his 27-page Chapter 10. Before 2010, venture capital in China was behind Europe, but today it’s challenging the USA:


Source: Mallaby’s The Power Law, appendix, page 413.

Mallaby convincingly explains that it developed not with the support of, but bypassing the Chinese government and surprisingly thanks to a combination US venture capitalists and Chinese people who had been in close contact to the American entrepreneurial culture. I knew nobody from the people below but one entrepreneur (you can check their names at the end of the post).

I had heard about the BATX which are nowadays compared to the GAFA and I loved Jack Ma’s video which could have been given by many Silicon Valley entrepreneurs. Here it is again:

I had a few Chinese startups in my 800+ cap tables and they are mostly internet and ecommerce companies. Mallaby seems to have similar views. I extracted them all (see below) and here are a few interesting characteristics:

Not only are they mostly internet/ecommerce companies, but they are recent, went public quickly, their founders are younger than average, keep more equity than others, and they have many more founding CEOs than the average. Interesting…

Equity List China

In the image above are the:
Funders: Gary Rieschel (Qiming), Neil Shen (Sequoia China), JP Gan, Hans Tung (ex-Qiming), Kathy Xu (Capital Today), Syaru Shirley Lin (ex-Goldman Sachs)
Founders: Jack Ma, Richard Liu, Wang Xing

The Power Law and Venture Capital – according to Sebastian Mallaby

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Sebastian Mallaby has just published a new book about Venture Capital which looks very interesting. I have already explained here what the Power Law is and will not do it again. But I will quote Mallaby as I do when I read good books.

About the term : “Venture capital” had also cropped up in 1938 when Lammont du Pont, the president of E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Company spoke before the US Senate Committee to Investigate Unemployment and Relief. “By Venture Capital I mean that capital which will go into an enterprise and not expect an immediate return, but will take its chances on getting an ultimate return” du Pont clarified. […] but this phrase making did not stick and the term was not widely used until at least the 60s. [Note 28 page 418]

And what about this : “All progress depends upon the unreasonable man, the creatively maladjusted. Most people think improbable ideas are unimportant, but the only thing that’s important is something that’s improbable”. From Vinod Khosla [Page 3]

About the return of VC. The normal distribution applies to size, weight of individuals, traditional stock markets, but the power law applies to the exceptional – wealth of individuals when not really regulated, as well as venture capital: Like the 7-foot NBA star, unexpected large price jumps are rare enough and moderate enough that they do not affect the average. The S&P500 budged less than 3% in 7763 days out of 7817 between 1985 and 2015, that is 98% of the time. […] Now consider venture capital. Hosley Bridge is an investment company which had stakes in venture funds that backed 7,000 startups between 1985 and 2014. A small subset of these deals, accounting for just 5% of the capital deployed generated fully 60 percent of all the Hosley Bridge returns. [Page 8]

Examples of Khosla’s deals [Page 10]

Startup Investment Return Multiple
Juniper Networks $5M $7B 1,400
Siara A few $M $1,5B >150
Cerent $8M Bought for $7B

About predictions: The revolutions that will matter – the big disruptions that create wealth for inventors [and investors! HL note] and anxiety for workers, or that scramble the geopolitical balance and alter human relations – cannot be predicted based on extrapolations of past data, precisely because such revolutions are so thoroughly disruptive. Rather, they will emerge as a result of forces that are too complex to forecast – from the primordial soup of tinkerers and hackers and hubristic dreamers – and all you can know is that the world in ten years will be excitingly different. […] the future can be discovered by means of iterative, venture-backed experiments. It cannot be predicted. [Page 11] “I always tell my CEOs, don’t plan. Keep testing the assumptions and iterating” Khosla again. [Note 32, page 416] All this of course reminds me also about the Black Swan.

Why is venture capital so different from other sources of finance? Most financiers allocate scarce capital based on quantitative analysis. venture capitalists meet people, charm people, and seldom bother with spreadsheets [*]. Most financiers value companies by projecting their cash flows. Venture capitalists frequently back startups before they have cash flows to analyze. Other financiers trade millions of dollars of paper assets in the blink of an eye. Venture capitalists take relatively small stakes in real companies and hold them. Most fundamentally, other financiers extrapolate trends from the past, disregarding the risk of extreme “tail” events. Venture capitalists look for radical departures from the past. Tail events are all they care about. [Page 14]

[*] Academic survey work confirms that one in five venture capitalists do not even attempt to forecast cash flows when making an investment decision. [Note 36 page 416]

All this is from the introductory chapter only and I liked it very much. Maybe more soon but in the mean time, you can always have a look at my visual history of venture capital.

Venture capital by Bill Janeway (part II)

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In a remarkable new series of videos, Venture Capital in the 21st Century, Bill Janeway describes the value and challenges of technology innovation. I mentioned in my last post the perfomance of venture capital, his third video.

The first video, Investing at the Technological Frontier, describing the radical uncertainty of innovation and how it contributes to economic development.

In the second video, What Venture Capitalists Do, he further develops his thoughts that I summarize through a few screenshots below. (They are self explanatory and you should certainly listen to Janeway if you are curious or intrigued).

The 4th video, The Failure of Market Failure, opens the debate of state intervention and private speculation. This important topic has been largely debated by Mariana Mazzucato and you will find additional posts under tag #mazzucato.

How Venture Capitalists Are Deforming Capitalism

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This is the title of a great article from the not less great New Yorker, dated November 23, 2020 and written by Charles Duhigg:

How Venture Capitalists Are Deforming Capitalism,
Even the worst-run startup can beat competitors if investors prop it up. The V.C. firm Benchmark helped enable WeWork to make one wild mistake after another—hoping that its gamble would pay off before disaster struck.


Illustration by Golden Cosmos (from the New Yorker article)

I am infringing copyright here and hope the magazine and author will forgive me. But the illustration says so well what the author describes! Yes, for a few years now, venture capital has become a crazy money spending machine.

I already posted blog about VC crises as over time the activity as evolved. From frugal investors in technology in the 60s and particularly in the 70s (Apple, Microsoft,..) and 80s (Cisco, Sun, …) The internet “bubble” was not the first period of hubris, there was one in the early eighties with tons of PC clones. But the real hubris came with the social media. Today, startups raise hundreds of millions of dollars before going public and experience huge, huge losses even at IPO as you may want to check in my 600 startups analysis (and it will be probably even worse in my 700 startups analysis to come). Here are past articles:

September 2020: Theranos, the (not so)-Silicon Valley biggest scandal ever – https://www.startup-book.com/2020/09/12/theranos-the-not-so-silicon-valley-biggest-scandal-ever/

April 2016: Is the Venture Capital model broken? – https://www.startup-book.com/2016/04/26/is-the-venture-capital-model-broken/

January 2016: Is Silicon Valley crazy (again)? – https://www.startup-book.com/2016/01/28/is-silicon-valley-crazy-again/

January 2011: Is there something rotten in the kingdom of VC? –
https://www.startup-book.com/2011/01/27/is-there-something-rotten-in-the-kingdom-of-vc/

At this point read carefully what venture capital was according to the author of the article: From the start, venture capitalists have presented their profession as an elevated calling. They weren’t mere speculators—they were midwives to innovation. The first V.C. firms were designed to make money by identifying and supporting the most brilliant startup ideas, providing the funds and the strategic advice that daring entrepreneurs needed in order to prosper. For decades, such boasts were merited. Genentech, which helped invent synthetic insulin, in the nineteen-seventies, succeeded in large part because of the stewardship of the venture capitalist Tom Perkins, whose company, Kleiner Perkins, made an initial hundred-thousand-dollar investment. Perkins demanded a seat on Genentech’s board of directors, and then began spending one afternoon a week in the startup’s offices, scrutinizing spending reports and browbeating inexperienced executives. In subsequent years, Kleiner Perkins nurtured such tech startups as Amazon, Google, Sun Microsystems, and Compaq. When Perkins died, in 2016, at the age of eighty-four, an obituary in the Financial Times remembered him as “part of a new movement in finance that saw investors roll up their sleeves and play an active role in management.”

But some famous experts of innovation are quoted about the current situation:

Steve Blank: “I’ve watched the industry become a money-hungry mob. V.C.s today aren’t interested in the public good. They’re not interested in anything except optimizing their own profits and chasing the herd, and so they waste billions of dollars that could have gone to innovation that actually helps people.” and his answer to the crisis is quite strong: “The first time you see a venture capitalist prosecuted for failing to uphold their duty as a board member, you’re going to see Silicon Valley transform overnight. All it takes is one V.C. doing a perp walk and everyone gets the message—you’re responsible, you have a legal duty, and if you do things that are bad for society you’ll be called to account.”

Martin Kenney, the professor at the University of California, Davis, said, “Obama loved Silicon Valley and V.C.s, and Trump craved their approval.” He went on, “Regulators have been totally defanged from doing real investigations of venture-capital firms. I think people are finally waking up to the damage the tech industry and V.C.s can do, but it’s slow going.” Today’s V.C.s, “money-losing firms can continue operating and undercutting incumbents for far longer than previously.”

Josh Lerner, a professor at Harvard Business School: “Proclaiming founder loyalty is kind of expected now.”

A Harvard Business School professor, Nori Gerardo Lietz, noted that the document exposed WeWork’s “byzantine corporate structure, the continuing projected losses, the plethora of conflicts, the complete absence of any substantive corporate governance, and the uncommon ‘New Age’ parlance,” the S-1 was “misleading, and probably fraudulent.”

I will finish my post with a quote mentioned by Bruce Dunlevie, the partner from Benchmark who was one the WeWork boardmember, a task he did not handled perfectly even if not that badly. Nothing to add. “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely.” Lord Acton and the rest of the quote (not mentioned in the article) is “Great men are almost always bad men…”